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Abstract In this work, we shall formulate and address a problem of actuator at-
tacker synthesis for cyber-physical systems that are modeled by discrete-event sys-
tems. We assume the actuator attacker partially observes the execution of the closed-
loop system and it can modify each control command generated by the supervisor on
a specified attackable subset of the controllable events. We provide straightforward
reductions from the actuator attacker synthesis problems to the Ramadge-Wonham
supervisor synthesis problems. It then follows that it is possible to use the many tech-
niques and tools already developed for solving the supervisor synthesis problem to
solve the actuator attacker synthesis problem for free. In particular, we show that, if
the attacker cannot attack unobservable events to the supervisor, the reductions can
be carried out in polynomial time.
Keywords cyber-physical systems · discrete-event systems · supervisory control ·
actuator attack · partial observation
1 Introduction
Recently, security of cyber-physical systems has drawn much research interest within
the discrete-event systems and formalmethods community [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. For a recent survey on the discrete-
event systems based approach for the security of cyber-physical systems, the reader is
referred to [18]. In this paper, we shall focus on discrete-event systems as our model
of cyber-physical systems and consider the problem of attacker synthesis, as a major
step towards solving the resilient supervisor synthesis problem [14]. In particular, we
consider the synthesis of a successful actuator attacker [12], [14]. We assume the goal
of the actuator attacker is to remain covert in the process of attacking the closed-loop
systems until it causes damages, much in parallel to the framework of [3]. An actuator
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attacker is said to be successful if it achieves its goal. Correspondingly, a supervisor
is said to be resilient if a successful actuator attacker does not exist.
Some of the existing works consider the problem of deception attack [3], [4], [7],
where the attacker would accomplish the attack goal by altering the sensor readings.
There are also works that deal with actuator attacks as well as sensor attacks [2], [8], [9],
[15]. We provide some comparisons between the existing works and this work in the
following.
1. The works of [2] and [8] do not require the attacker to possess any knowledge of
the system’s models; consequently, they consider the worst case attack scenario (
attack the system whenever possible), and thus the problem of attacker synthesis
becomes irrelevant in their problem setup. In contrast, we consider attackers that
know the models of the system, including the plant’s and the supervisor’s models.
This allows the attacker to make informed attack decisions and makes it possible
to model different goals and constraints of the attackers. In particular, this allows
us to model the synthesis of risky attackers and covert attackers [12], [14]. More-
over, it is worth noting that imposing this assumption on the attacker’s knowledge
does not bring any harm. A supervisor that can guard against damages caused by
knowledgeable attackers can certainly also guard against “ignorant” attackers, if
we do not impose covertness assumption on knowledgeable attackers.
2. The only means of system protection in the setup of [2] and [8] is by making use
of an intrusion detection module for detecting the presence of an attacker, along
with a fixed supervisor that may not have been properly designed against actuator
attackers. Their setup does not consider the possibility of modifying the supervi-
sor to render attack impossible or harder. In comparison, the resilient supervisor
synthesis based approach in [3], [14] may allow the synthesis of a supervisor that
can prevent the damages caused by attackers, by making attack impossible or by
making attack futile1, even in the absence of a monitor, or by discouraging attack
attempt if covertness assumption is imposed, in the presence of a monitor [12]. In
particular, [2] and [8] only address the problem of verification, instead of synthe-
sis, for security.
3. The work of [15] is more closely related to our work and is based on the resilient
supervisor synthesis framework. It attempts to present a generalization of [3] that
uses non-deterministic finite state transducers as the unifying models and address
the security against both actuator attackers and sensor attackers. However, it only
deals with the verification of resilient supervisor upon newly defined controllabil-
ity condition. The problem of synthesis of resilient supervisor remains unsolved
if the controllability condition is not satisfied. We note that solving the problem of
attacker synthesis in this work naturally solves the resilient supervisor verification
problem and can be used for solving the resilient supervisor synthesis problem as
well, as explained in [14].
4. In [12], [13] and [14], we have considered partially-observing attackers that also
eavesdrop the control commands sent by the supervisor. Given the same observa-
1 If we do not restrict ourselves to the synthesis of supremal or maximal supervisors, then often there is
a range of supervisors to choose from. For example, the supervisor could be designed in such a way that
either every disabled event is non-attackable, which makes attack impossible, or every disabled attackable
event cannot bring the system to damage, which makes attack futile.
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tion capability over the plant events, the control command eavesdropping attacker
is more powerful than the attacker considered in this work. In [17], a notion of
a powerful attacker is defined for passive attackers. In particular, a passive at-
tacker is defined to be powerful in [17] if it can directly query some information
about the current state of the plant. A control command eavesdropping attacker
in [12] can be considered a powerful attacker in the sense of [17], but in a more
indirect but arguably a more realistic way. In particular, the supervisor’s control
command does encode some knowledge of the partially-observing supervisor on
the execution of the plant. We would expect that the technique used for synthesiz-
ing non-eavesdroping attackers can be extended to synthesizing control command
eavesdropping attackers.
In this work, we shall focus on the actuator attacker synthesis problem. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries. Then, in Section 3, we
shall provide a detailed explanation about the system setup, including a formulation
of the supervisor, the actuator attacker, the damage automaton, the monitoring mech-
anism, the attacked closed-loop system and the attack goal. In Section 4, we then
provide straightforward reductions from the actuator attacker synthesis problems to
the supervisor synthesis problems. Finally, discussions and conclusions are presented
in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of supervisory control theory [19], [20]
and automata theory [21]. In this section, we shall recall the basic notions and termi-
nology that are necessary to understand this work.
For any two sets A and B, we use A×B to denote their Cartesian product and use
A−B to denote their set difference. |A| is used to denote the cardinality of set A.
A (partial) finite state automaton G over alphabet Σ is a 5-tuple (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0,Qm),
where Q is the finite set of states, δ :Q×Σ −→Q the partial transition function2, q0 ∈
Q the initial state and Qm ⊆ Q the set of marked states. Let L(G) and Lm(G) denote
the closed-behavior and the marked-behavior of G, respectively [19]. When Qm = Q,
we also write G = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0) for simplicity. For any two finite state automata G1 =
(Q1,Σ1,δ1,q1,0,Q1,m),G2 = (Q2,Σ2,δ2,q2,0,Q2,m), we write G := G1‖G2 to denote
their synchronous product. Then, we have that G=(Q :=Q1×Q2,Σ :=Σ1∪Σ2,δ :=
δ1‖δ2,q0 := (q1,0,q2,0),Qm := Q1,m×Q2,m), where the (partial) transition function δ
is defined as follows: for any q = (q1,q2) ∈ Q and any
3 σ ∈ Σ ,
δ (q,σ) :=


(δ1(q1,σ),q2), if σ ∈ Σ1\Σ2
(q1,δ2(q2,σ)), if σ ∈ Σ2\Σ1
(δ1(q1,σ),δ2(q2,σ)), if σ ∈ Σ1∩Σ2
2 We write δ (q,σ)! to mean δ (q,σ) is defined and write ¬δ (q,σ)! to mean δ (q,σ) is undefined. As
usual, δ is naturally extended to the partial transition function δ :Q×Σ ∗→Q such that, for any q∈Q, any
s ∈ Σ ∗ and any σ ∈ Σ , δ (q,ε) = q and δ (q,sσ) = δ (δ (q,s),σ). We define δ (Q′,σ) = {δ (q,σ) | q ∈ Q′}
for any Q′ ⊆ Q.
3 For example, if σ ∈ Σ1\Σ2 and δ1(q1,σ) is undefined, we treat δ (q,σ) as undefined.
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A control constraint over Σ is a tuple (Σc,Σo) of sub-alphabets of Σ , where Σo ⊆ Σ
denotes the subset of observable events (for the supervisor) and Σc ⊆ Σ denotes the
subset of controllable events (for the supervisor). Let Σuo = Σ −Σo ⊆ Σ denote the
subset of unobservable events (for the supervisor) and let Σuc = Σ −Σc ⊆ Σ denote
the subset of uncontrollable events (for the supervisor). For each sub-alphabetΣ ′⊆Σ ,
the natural projection PΣ ′ : Σ
∗ → Σ ′∗ is defined, which is extended to a map between
languages as usual [19]. Let G = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0). We shall abuse the notation and define
PΣ ′(G) to be the finite state automaton (2
Q,Σ ,∆ ,URG,Σ−Σ ′(q0)), where the unob-
servable reach URG,Σ−Σ ′(q0) := {q ∈ Q | ∃s ∈ (Σ −Σ
′)∗,q = δ (q0,s)} of q0 with
respect to the sub-alphabet Σ −Σ ′ ⊆ Σ is the initial state, and the partial transition
function ∆ : 2Q×Σ −→ 2Q is defined as follows.
1. For any ∅ 6= Q′ ⊆ Q and any σ ∈ Σ ′, ∆(Q′,σ) = URG,Σ−Σ ′(δ (Q
′,σ)), where
URG,Σ−Σ ′(Q
′) :=
⋃
q∈Q′ URG,Σ−Σ ′(q) for any Q
′ ⊆ Q,;
2. for any ∅ 6= Q′ ⊆ Q and any σ ∈ Σ −Σ ′, ∆(Q′,σ) = Q′.
In particular, we shall note that PΣ ′(G) is over the alphabet Σ and there is no transition
defined at the state ∅ ∈ 2Q. A finite state automaton G = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0,Qm) is said to
be non-blocking if every reachable state in G can reach a marked state in Qm.
3 System Setup
In this section, we shall introduce the system setup that will be followed in this work.
Intuitive explanations about the basic ideas and assumptions are provided in Sec-
tion 3.1. After that, a formal setup is provided in Section 3.2.
3.1 Basic Ideas
The plantG, which is a finite state automaton overΣ , is under the control of a partially
observing supervisor S over (Σc,Σo), which is also given by a finite state automaton
over Σ . In addition, we assume the existence of an actuator attacker A that partially
observes the execution of the closed-loop system and is able to modify the control
command γ (generated by the supervisor) on a specified attackable subset Σc,A ⊆ Σc
of the controllable events. The plant G then follows the modified control command γ ′
instead of γ . We assume the supervisor S is augmented with a monitoring mechanism
that monitors the execution of the closed-loop system (under attack). If σ ∈ Σc,A is
enabled by the supervisor in γ , then the attacker is not discovered4 by the supervisor
when it disables σ in γ ′. The supervisor can conclude the existence of an attacker
the first moment when it observes an inconsistency between what it has observed
and what shall be observed without an attacker. We assume that the attacker has a
complete knowledge about the models of the plant G and the supervisor S, as well
as the control constraint (Σc,Σo). Intuitively, the goal of the attacker is to remain
4 The supervisor is not sure whether σ has been disabled by an attacker, even if disabling σ may result
in deadlock, as the supervisor is never sure whether: 1) deadlock has occurred due to actuator attack, or 2)
σ will possibly fire soon (according to the internal mechanism of the plant).
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covert in the process of attacking the closed-loop systems until it causes damages, by
generating certain damaging strings. The supervisor has a mechanism for halting the
execution of the closed-loop system after discovering an actuator attack. We shall as-
sume no communication delay is involved for the sending and receiving of observable
events and control commands.
3.2 Formal Setup
In this section, we explain the formal setup that is used in this work. We first need to
introduce and present a formalization of the system components.
Supervisor: In the absence of attacker, a supervisor over control constraint (Σc,Σo)
is modeled by a finite state automaton S = (X ,Σ ,ζ ,x0) that satisfies the controllabil-
ity and observability constraints [22]:
• (controllability) for any state x∈X and any uncontrollable eventσ ∈Σuc, ζ (x,σ)!,
• (observability) for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event σ ∈ Σuo, ζ (x,σ)!
implies ζ (x,σ) = x,
Plant: The plant is modeled by a finite state automatonG = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0) as usual.
Whenever the plant fires an observable transition δ (q,σ) = q′, it sends the observable
event σ to the supervisor.
Actuator Attacker: We assume the attacker knows the model of the plant G and
the model of the supervisor S. We impose some restrictions on the capability of the
attacker. Let Σo,A ⊆ Σ denote the subset of (plant) events that can be observed by the
attacker. Let Σc,A ⊆ Σc denote the set of attackable events. The attacker can modify
the control command γ generated by the supervisor on the subset Σc,A.
We henceforth name (Σo,A,Σc,A) as an attack constraint. An actuator attacker over
attack constraint (Σo,A,Σc,A) is modeled by a finite state automaton A = (Y,Σ ,β ,y0)
that satisfies the following constraints.
• (A-controllability) for any state y ∈ Y and any unattackable event σ ∈ Σ −Σc,A,
β (y,σ)!,
• (A-observability) for any state y ∈Y and any unobservable event σ ∈ Σ −Σo,A to
the attacker, β (y,σ)! implies β (y,σ) = y,
Compared with [12] and [3], here we have adopted a unifying model for the modeling
of the plant, the supervisor and the attacker. In particular, it is straightforward to see
that an attacker A over attack constraint (Σo,A,Σc,A) can also be viewed as a supervisor
over control constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A).
DamageAutomaton: To specify in a general manner what strings can cause dam-
ages, we shall adopt a complete finite state automaton H = (W,Σ ,χ ,w0,Wm) [12]. In
particular, each string s ∈ Lm(H) is a damage-inflicting string that the attacker would
like the attacked closed-loop system to generate. In the special case of state avoidance
property, we can get rid of H and introduce the set Qbad ⊆ Q of bad states to avoid
in the plant G. Without loss of generality, we shall make the assumption that each
w ∈Wm is a sink state, i.e., ∀σ ∈ Σ ,w ∈Wm,χ(w,σ) = w. Intuitively, this means that
the damage is never recoverable. Thus, we can assume |Wm| = 1, i.e., there is only
one sink state, without loss of generality. Let H = (W,Σ ,χ ,w0,{wm}) in the rest.
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Monitoring Mechanism: In the presence of an attacker, we assume the supervi-
sor is augmented with a monitoring mechanism. We assume, without loss of general-
ity, that the execution of the attacked closed-loop system is immediately halted5 once
the supervisor discovers the presence of an attacker. The supervisor online records its
observationw∈Σ∗o of the execution of the (attacked) closed-loop system. It concludes
the existence of an attacker and then halts the execution of the (attacked) closed-loop
system the first time when it observes some string w /∈ PΣo(L(S‖G)).
Attacked Closed-loop System: The attacked closed-loop system consists of the
three main components G, S and A. However, the synchronous product of G, S and A
is not the attacked closed-loop system for the following two reasons.
1. The effect of attack on the supervisor is not reflected in S
2. The monitoring mechanism has not been encoded in S
The first problem can be solved by computing the (fully) attacked supervisor SA. Let
S = (X ,Σ ,ζ ,x0). We let S
A = (X ∪{xhalt},Σ ,ζ
A,x0) denote the attacked supervisor,
where xhalt /∈X denotes a distinguished halting state and the partial transition function
ζ A : (X ∪{xhalt})×Σ −→ (X ∪{xhalt}) is obtained from ζ as follows.
a) for any x,x′ ∈ X and any σ ∈ Σ , if ζ (x,σ) = x′, then ζ A(x,σ) = x′
b) for any x ∈ X and any σ ∈ Σuo ∩Σc,A, if ¬ζ (x,σ)!, then ζ
A(x,σ) = x
c) for any x ∈ X and any σ ∈ Σo ∩Σc,A, if ¬ζ (x,σ)!, then ζ
A(x,σ) = xhalt
Intuitively, to obtain SA, for each state x∈ X and each event σ ∈ Σuo∩Σc,A, if σ is not
defined at state x, we then add a self-loop at state x labeled by σ ; for each state x ∈ X
and each event σ ∈ Σo ∩Σc,A, if σ is not defined at state x, we then add a transition
from x to the halting state xhalt labeled by σ . In particular, we note that there is no
transition defined at state xhalt and every state in S
A is a marked state.
With SA, we effectively assume an ignorant and risky attacker, in the sense of [2]
and [8], that enables each attackable event at each state. Then, the rest of the attack
decisions for the actuator attacker is to disable attackable events properly, based on its
own partial observation and its knowledge on the system’s models, to ensure covert-
ness and damage-infliction. This then brings the actuator attacker synthesis problem
closer to the supervisor synthesis problem.
The second problem has been partially solved in the solution to the first problem.
In particular, if SA enters xhalt , then we know that attack must have happened. This is
insufficient, however. Recall that the supervisor concludes the existence of an attacker
and then halts the execution of the (attacked) closed-loop system the first time when it
observes some string w /∈PΣo(L(S‖G)). We now denote S‖G=(X×Q,Σ ,λ ,(x0,q0)),
where λ = ζ‖δ . Then, we have
PΣo(S‖G) = (2
X×Q,Σ ,Λ ,URS‖G,Σ−Σo(x0,q0)),
where URS‖G,Σ−Σo(x0,q0) denotes the unobservable reach of (x0,q0) with respect to
the sub-alphabet Σ −Σo in S‖G and the partial transition function Λ : 2
X×Q×Σ −→
2X×Q is defined such that,
5 In [8], when the supervisor detects the presence of an attacker, all controllable events will be disabled,
while uncontrollable events can still occur (i.e., immediate halt by reset is impossible). This is not difficult
to accommodate, by using a device H that defines the set of damage-inflicting strings [12]. In particular, if
uncontrollable events can still occur after the detection, then we only need to use H′ = H ∪H/Σ ∗uc, where
H/Σ ∗uc := {s ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃s′ ∈ Σ ∗uc,ss
′ ∈ H}, as the renewed set of damage-inflicting strings.
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1. for any ∅ 6= D ⊆ X ×Q and any σ ∈ Σo, Λ(D,σ) =URS‖G,Σ−Σo(λ (D,σ));
2. for any ∅ 6= D ⊆ X ×Q and any σ ∈ Σ −Σo, Λ(D,σ) = D.
Intuitively, we can use PΣo(S‖G) to track the belief ∅ 6= D ⊆ X ×Q of the supervi-
sor on the current states of the unattacked closed-loop system S‖G, for monitoring
purpose. When the current belief of the supervisor is ∅ 6= D ⊆ X ×Q and σ ∈ Σo is
executed with λ (D,σ) = ∅, the supervisor detects an inconsistency and determines
that attack must have already happened and thus halts the execution of the attacked
closed-loop system. In particular, we shall note that there is no transition defined at
state ∅ ∈ 2X×Q and every state in PΣo(S‖G) is a marked state.
Given the plant G, the supervisor S and the attacker A, the attacked closed-loop
system is the synchronous product G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A, which is a finite state automa-
ton over Σ . Since the set of states the supervisor believes itself to be residing in is
a singleton (due to the observability constraint for a supervisor) and corresponds to
the state that it actually resides in, whenever PΣo(S‖G) is not in the state ∅, the state
space of G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A, when restricted to the reachable state set, is isomorphic
to Q× (X ×{xhalt})×2
Q×Y . In the rest, we consider Q× (X ×{xhalt})×2
Q×Y as
the state space.
Successful Actuator Attackers: In this work, we shall focus on covert attackers6.
Given the damage automaton H = (W,Σ ,χ ,w0,{wm}), the definition of covertness is
given in the following.
Definition 1 (Covertness)Given any plant G, any supervisor S, any actuator attacker
A and any damage automaton H, A is said to be covert on (G,S) with respect to H
if each state in {(q,x,DQ,y,w) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})× 2
Q×Y ×W | (x = xhalt ∨DQ =
∅)∧w 6= wm} is not reachable in G‖S
A‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H.
We shall consider two “possibilistic” interpretation of damaging goals for covert
actuator attackers. The first interpretation of interest is the damage-nonblocking goal,
which intuitively states that it is always possible to reach damages in the attacked
closed-loop system, wherever the current state is for the attacked closed-loop system.
That is, for any string s ∈ L(G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A) generated by the attacked closed-
loop system, it is always possible to extend it in G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A to some string in
Lm(H). This is formally captured by the next definition.
Definition 2 (Damage-nonblocking)Given any plant G, any supervisor S, any dam-
age automaton H and any covert actuator attacker A on (G,S) with respect to H, A is
said to be damage-nonblocking on (G,S) with respect to H if G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H
is non-blocking.
The second interpretation of interest for us is the damage-reachable goal [12], [13], [14],
which intuitively states that it is possible to reach damages in the attacked closed-
loop system from the initial state. It is worth mentioning that, due to the existence of
events that are beyond the control of an attacker, that is, any event σ /∈ Σc,A, this is ar-
guably the weakest interpretation for damage-infliction goal. We here note that the set
of marked states for G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H is {(q,x,DQ,y,w) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})×
2Q×Y ×W | w = wm}.
6 It is possible to model covert attackers and risky attackers in a unifying manner, see [14].
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Definition 3 (Damage-reachable)Given any plant G, any supervisor S, any damage
automaton H and any covert actuator attacker A on (G,S) with respect to H, A is
said to be damage-reachable on (G,S) with respect to H if some marked state in
G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H is reachable, that is, Lm(G‖S
A‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H) 6=∅.
It is clear that the damage-nonblockinggoal is stronger than the damage-reachable
goal.
Proposition 1 Given any plant G over Σ , any supervisor S over control constraint
(Σc,Σo), any attack constraint (Σo,A,Σc,A) and any damage automaton H over Σ , if
a covert actuator attacker A over (Σo,A,Σc,A) is damage-nonblocking on (G,S) with
respect to H, then A is damage-reachable on (G,S) with respect to H.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the definitions of the damage-nonblocking
goal and the damage-reachable goal. In particular, G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H is non-
blocking implies that some marked state in G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A‖H is reachable.
4 Actuator Attacker Synthesis
In this section, we provide straightforward reductions from the actuator attacker syn-
thesis problems, with the two different attack goals, to the Ramadge-Wonham super-
visor synthesis problems. It then follows that we can use the techniques and tools
developed for solving the supervisor synthesis problem to solve the actuator attacker
synthesis problem for free. We shall provide the reductions for the two different in-
terpretations of damaging goals, separately. The details of the reductions are summa-
rized in the next two theorems.
Theorem 1 Given any plant G over Σ , any supervisor S over control constraint
C = (Σc,Σo), any attack constraint A = (Σo,A,Σc,A) and any damage automaton
H over Σ , there is a damage-nonblocking covert actuator attacker A over A on
(G,S) with respect to H iff there is a supervisor S′ over C ′ = (Σc,A,Σo,A) such that
S′‖P avoids reaching the set BAD of bad states in P and S′‖P is non-blocking, where
P = G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖H and BAD := {(q,x,DQ,w) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})× 2
Q ×W |
(x = xhalt ∨DQ =∅)∧w 6= wm}.
Proof. This straightforwardly follows from the definition of a damage-nonblocking
covert actuator attacker. In particular, A is a damage-nonblocking covert actuator at-
tacker over A on (G,S) with respect to H iff as a supervisor over C ′ = (Σc,A,Σo,A),
A‖P avoids reaching the set BAD of bad states in P and A‖P is non-blocking, where
P = G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖H and BAD := {(q,x,DQ,w) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})× 2
Q×W |
(x = xhalt ∨DQ =∅)∧w 6= wm}.
Theorem 2 Given any plant G over Σ , any supervisor S over control constraint
C = (Σc,Σo), any attack constraint A = (Σo,A,Σc,A) and any damage automaton
H over Σ , there is a damage-reachable covert actuator attacker A over A on (G,S)
with respect to H iff there is a supervisor S′ over C ′ = (Σc,A,Σo,A) such that S
′‖P
avoids reaching the set BAD of bad states in P and Lm(S
′‖P) 6= ∅, where P =
G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖H and BAD := {(q,x,DQ,w) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})× 2
Q×W | (x =
xhalt ∨DQ =∅)∧w 6= wm}.
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Proof. This straightforwardly follows from the definition of a damage-reachable covert
actuator attacker. In particular, A is a damage-reachable covert actuator attacker over
A on (G,S) with respect to H iff as a supervisor over C ′ = (Σc,A,Σo,A), A‖P avoids
reaching the setBAD of bad states in P and Lm(A‖P) 6=∅, whereP=G‖S
A‖PΣo(S‖G)‖H
and BAD := {(q,x,DQ,w) ∈Q×(X∪{xhalt})×2
Q×W | (x = xhalt ∨DQ =∅)∧w 6=
wm}.
In general, the reductions provided in the above two theorems cannot be carried
out in polynomial time. The main trouble is due to the need for tracking the state in
PΣo(S‖G), whose state size is in general exponential in the state size of G (modulo
the state space of S). Under certain assumption on the set of attackable events, the
above reductions are indeed polynomial time reductions, regardless of the models for
S and G. One example is given in the next result.
Theorem 3 If Σuo ∩Σc,A = ∅, then the actuator attacker synthesis problem is poly-
nomial time reducible to the supervisor synthesis problem, for both the damage-
nonblocking goal and the damage-reachable goal.
Proof. Consider the attacked closed-loop system G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A. We now restore
the component 2X×Q for analysis; then a state of G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A is of the form
(q,x,D,y) ∈ Q× (X ∪{xhalt})× 2
X×Q×Y . Let dom(D) := {x ∈ X | ∃q ∈ Q,(x,q) ∈
D}. We have already known that dom(D) is the singleton {x}, when restricted to the
reachable state set of G‖SA‖PΣo(S‖G)‖A. Let Img(D) := {q∈D | ∃x∈X ,(x,q)∈D}.
When the belief of the supervisor is ∅ 6= D ⊆ X ×Q and σ ∈ Σo is executed with
λ (D,σ) =∅, the supervisor detects an inconsistency and determines that attack must
have already happened. There are two possible reasons for λ (D,σ) = ∅. The first
reason is when ζ (x,σ) is undefined for the unique state x∈ dom(D). This has already
been taken care of by the component SA. The second reason is when δ (Img(D),σ) =
∅, which can be tracked with the component PΣo(S‖G). However, since σ has been
executed at the current plant state q ∈ Q, we conclude that q /∈ Img(D). That is, the
current state the plant is in does not belong to the set of states the supervisor believes
the plant to be residing in. This is only possible if some event σ ′ ∈Σuo∩Σc,A has been
enabled by the actuator attacker but disabled by the supervisor in the past execution.
If Σuo∩Σc,A =∅, then the above possibility can be ruled out.
Thus, we can effectively get rid of the component 2Q (due to the use of PΣo(S‖G))
in the construction of the attacked closed-loop systems, when Σuo∩Σc,A =∅. It fol-
lows that the reductions provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are polynomial time
reductions when Σuo ∩Σc,A =∅.
Intuitively, if the actuator attacker cannot attack those unobservable events to the
supervisor, then the reductions provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, after removing
the component 2Q, are polynomial time reductions. In the following remark, we shall
explain one implication of Theorem 3.
Remark 1 If Σuo∩Σc =∅, that is, when the given supervisor S satisfies the normality
property [19], then we also have Σuo∩Σc,A =∅, since Σc,A ⊆ Σc. We consider this to
be not quite restrictive. A supervisor satisfying the normality property leaves much
reduced attack surfaces for the actuator attacker [12], since events that are disabled
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are observable to the supervisor and enabling those disabled (attackable) events (by
the actuator attacker) may immediately break the covertness of the attacker, if they
are also enabled by the plant. Thus, being suspicious of the presence of an attacker,
the designer may prefer to synthesize supervisors that satisfy the normality property.
One option to realize the normality synthesis for the supervisors is by enlarging the
observable event set Σo (e.g., deploy more sensors).
With the reductions provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the actuator attacker
synthesis problem can be solved using the algorithm developed in [23], for both the
damage-nonblocking goal and the damage-reachable goal. If there are some restric-
tions on the actuator attacker’s capability, then it is possible to reduce the synthesis
complexity. For example, consider the case Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A where the normality synthe-
sis procedure can be used [19], [24] for the synthesis of successful actuator attackers,
we can use many off-the-shelf (symbolic) synthesis tools (see, for example, the tools
STSLib [25] and Supremica [26]).
5 Discussions and Conclusions
In this work, we have presented a formulation of the actuator attacker synthesis prob-
lem in the formalism of discrete-event systems. In particular, we have addressed the
problems of synthesis of covert actuator attackers with the damage-nonblocking goal
and with the damage-reachable goal, respectively. The technique to solve the actua-
tor attacker synthesis problem is by reduction to the well-studied supervisor synthesis
problem, instead of developing new synthesis algorithms. In the rest of this section,
we provide a discussion of some future works that can be carried out.
Synthesis of Powerful Actuator and Sensor Attackers: This work only consid-
ers the synthesis of actuator attackers. One of the immediate future works is to con-
sider the synthesis of actuator and sensor attackers. In particular, we intend to address
the synthesis of powerful attackers that are able to eavesdrop the control commands
sent by the supervisor [12], [14].
The solution to the attacker synthesis problem has immediate applications to the
resilient supervisor synthesis problem, as explained in [14].
Optimal Attraction Attacker: The attacker considered in this work only ensures
damage-reachability or damage-nonblockingness. There is no mechanism for ensur-
ing “necessity”7 of damage-infliction or optimization of attacker to achieve damage-
infliction as soon as possible. This will be addressed in the future work.
Resilient Supervisor Synthesis: The problem of resilient supervisor synthesis
needs to be addressed as well. In [14], a bounded resilient supervisor synthesis ap-
proach has been developed as a semi-decision procedure for the synthesis of resilient
supervisors against powerful actuator attackers. One of the immediate future works
is to consider the synthesis of bounded resilient supervisors against powerful actua-
tor and sensor attackers. It is also of interest for us to explore other (semi-)decision
procedures for resilient supervisor synthesis.
7 Arguably, the damage-nonblocking goal ensures “necessity” of damage-infliction in the long run.
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